Independent Monitoring Board of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
Eighth Report October 2013
[60 pages: http://www.polioeradication.org/Portals/0/Document/Aboutus/Governance/IMB/9IMBMeeting/9IMB_Report_EN.pdf ]
The Independent Monitoring Board provides an independent assessment of the progress being made by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in the detection and interruption of polio transmission globally.
This eighth report follows our ninth meeting, held in London from 1 to 3 October 2013.
At our meetings, we benefit from the time and energy of many partners of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. We value our open discussions with these many people, but the views presented here are our own. Independence remains at the heart of our role. Each of us sits on the board in a personal capacity. As always, this report presents our findings frankly, objectively, and without fear or favour.
Selected Excerpts
[From p. 40]
The Red List: countries at highest risk of a polio outbreak
YEMEN UGANDA SYRIA LEBANON JORDAN IRAQ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC UKRAINE
MALI DJIBOUTI ERITREA SUDAN SOUTH SUDAN
The IMB considers these countries to be on the Red List. The program needs to establish a definitive Red List and act on it quickly.
[Full text of Conclusions And Recommendations beginning p.57 minus a graphic on Program Standards unable to be reproduced here]
Conclusions and recommendations
Unprecedented challenges loom over today’s polio eradication program. Levels of intimidation and violence – including horrific deaths of polio workers – have reached such a level that those giving or accepting the vaccine too often do so in harrowing and hazardous circumstances. The program is banned from accessing crucial areas, in which polio is paralysing and killing children – one million children in Somalia and another million in Pakistan cannot be vaccinated against polio because those in control of the territories are not allowing the program to operate there.
The program has dealt with insecurity before (and continues to do so), but these are different, unprecedented phenomena. All who support the eradication of the second ever disease for humankind should have no greater priority than finding ways to resolve these huge challenges. This is the greatest test of the World Health Assembly’s declaration that global polio eradication is a “programmatic emergency for global public health”.
Operationally, the program has far from perfect control in such circumstances. Whilst we are sympathetic to the challenge that this creates, it is more important than ever that the program’s performance is as eradication-ready – as worthy of a global public health emergency – as it can be, in the many aspects that remain within its control. There are too many instances in which this is not the case. The performance issues to be addressed are illustrated by (but not limited to) the fact that the Horn of Africa was not better protected against an outbreak and that too many other countries remain vulnerable. They are illustrated too by the response in the Horn of Africa, which could not be described as a robust response to a public health emergency of global importance.
It is now fourteen months until the primary goal of the Strategic Plan (stopping global polio transmission) needs to be met. The list of problems to be resolved is formidable. The program needs to address insecurity and inaccessibility in each of the endemic countries, whilst continuing to tackle the campaigns that remain stubbornly suboptimal. It needs to regain lost ground in the Horn of Africa. It needs to pay attention to the considerable ‘Red List’ of vulnerable countries where neglect could enable the polio virus to run amok in parts of the world from which it has been thankfully absent for some time.
As the program enters what is supposed to be the last low season in which polio circulates, we ask ourselves (as should all within the program): it this a program that is eradication-ready? Does what we are seeing really look like a programmatic emergency for global public health? This report has identified too many ways in which this is not the case.
The goal of stopping polio transmission by the end of 2014 now stands at serious risk. This situation must be turned round with the greatest possible urgency.
This report has made 14 recommendations:
Pakistan
1. We recommend that achieving access in FATA be top priority for Pakistan’s polio program and all who support it, using all diplomatic means available
Nigeria
2. We recommend that the Nigerian Expert Review Committee ensures that detailed area-specific plans are in place to overcome the challenges in each of the Local Government Areas (LGAs) that need priority focus
Horn of Africa outbreak
3. We recommend that a joint WHO-UNICEF central command unit is established for the Horn of Africa, led by a single senior commander
4. We recommend that the Polio Oversight Board is immediately appraised of what partner staff are required in, and in support of, the Horn of Africa and oversees measures to get them in place by the end of November
5. We recommend that environmental surveillance be urgently established in Nairobi, Kenya
The novel situation in Israel
6. We recommend that Israel immediately schedules a second national OPV campaign, to be completed as quickly as possible
7. We recommend that the WHO Director General briefs Member States whose populations are currently protected against polio by IPV only on the implications of circulating poliovirus in Israel
Outbreaks waiting to happen
8. We recommend that a global action plan be drawn up, identifying a definitive Red List of the world’s most polio-vulnerable countries and actions to protect each of them
9. We restate our earlier recommendation that the International Health Regulations be used to ensure that all people travelling from a polio-endemic country be required to have vaccination prior to travel, and add that this should be extended to any persistently affected country
Insecurity and impositions of restrictions to access
10. We recommend that the Polio Oversight Board ensures that all of the planned security posts within the partner agencies are filled by the end of November, even if this requires extraordinary measures
11. We recommend that the partners consult and seek advice from the highest levels of the UN Security system and other experts
12. We recommend that all means be used to ensure that the polio program in every country is known to be politically neutral
Management and oversight of the global program
13. We recommend that the Polio Oversight Board commissions a comprehensive review of the program’s oversight and strategic and operational management, making a decision now about how to optimally time this
Potential IPV use in interrupting transmission
14. We recommend that the program agrees and makes a clear statement of policy on the use of IPV in stopping polio transmission, addressing the questions raised by the IMB in its May and October 2013 reports